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NOTES ON THE TERM STRATEGY 
A lecture delivered by 
Professor Edward Mead Earle 
at the Naval War College 
At!gust 22, 1949 
Admiral Beary and Gentlemen of the Naval War College: 
I ought to say first of all that I am particularly delighted 
to be here. This is my first appearance at the NavalWar College; 
That is not due to any lack of appreciation on my part of the Navy 
or sea power, but rather to the circumstances which from time to 
time have prevented rile from accepting previous invitations. So 
that, although this is the first actual appearance, I have a feeling 




I have chosen. this topic of "Notes on the Term Strategy," 
because, as has been said in the introduction, the term is one which 
is used in a very great variety of ways, with a great many different 
meanings, and not always with great exactitude. The term cannot, 
in the nature of things, be defined with great exactitude, and it cer­
tainly is not my purpose to give it a definitive and hide-bound 
definition this morning. What I prefer to do is to throw out a few 
ideas that are suggested by the word and to point particularly to 
some of the non-military phases of strategy which have become 
increasingly more significant in the last fifty years than they had 
theretofore been. 
The very word strategy came into use in the English 
language only toward the end of' the eighteenth century-some­
where after 1763, the end of the Seven Years' War. That in it-
Professor Earle is a Professor, School of Economics and Politics; 
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University. He is the co'­
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self is significant, I might say, as I'll point out presently. The 
word is of Greek derivation coming from the Greek "strategos" or 
"strategus". This "Strategus" was first a general officer. He was 
an officer of the military forces and in many cases in· Greece he 
was also the chief political officer of the government. It was true 
in Athens, it was true in the Achean league, that the "Strategus" 
was not only commander of forces in the field, but he was also 
the Chief Magistrate or whatever other designation the principal 
political office of the government happened to be. That idea· was 
carried over into the constitution of the United States, in which 
the President of the United States was made Commander in Chief 
of all the Armed Forces of the United States. In actual practice 
in most states, always in time of war, and more frequently than 
not in time of peace, the chief political officer of the government 
is also the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. It is usual 
in France-not always necessarily true, but usually true-that the 
Prime Minister may be the Minister of Defense ; and it frequent­
ly has been true in Britain that such is the case as well. 
In most of the Utopian literature of the eighteenth century, 
which influenced a good deal of the American political thought 
which entered into the constitution, the same thing was true­
that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces was the same 
person as the principal political officer of the government. So that, 
even in the very literal meaning of the word "strategy," there is 
an implication that it has political as well as military connotations, 
associations and implications. 
I said that the word did not come into very general use 
until the late eighteenth century. And the reason was that it was 
not until the eighteenth century that there was much point in dif­
ferentiating between tactics and strategy. "Tactics" was the word 
in very general use before the word "strategy". But as war be­
came somewhat more complicated in its character, for a variety of 
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;reasons, and finally when war involved the· very existence of a 
nation in arms with a revolutionary philosophy, as in the case of 
the French Revolution, it was clear that you had tq have a concept 
which concerned the handling of all the military resources of the 
nation and 'which was not confined merely to what went on in the 
actual battlefield. So long as the very idea of strategy involved 
simply a certain number of "ruses de guerre'' and devices for fooling 
the enemy as to the disposition of your troops, there wasn't enough 
difference between strategy and tactics to necessitate a real differ­
entiation in definition. In the first World War, but more particular­
ly in the last war, it was true that the Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces, the principal political agent of the government, 
played a conspicuous role in the actual conduct of the war. For ex­
ample, I suppose Franklin Roosevelt was more keenly aware of his 
job of being Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces than any 
other man who ever occupied the White House. Certainly 
Winston Churchill, more than any Prime· Minister before him, 
felt the keenness of his responsibility for making critical decisions 
in connection with the conduct of the war. The instance of Hitler 
is so obvious as to need no comment, and it is significant that 
Stalin eventually made himself Generalissimo of the Armed Forces 
of the Soviet Union as well as Chief of the Soviet State. Lincoln 
is an instl:\nce of a President who didn't quite know whether he was 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces primarily, or was Presi­
dent of the United States primarily, with the result that under 
Lincoln we had a good deal of bungling in the conduct of military 
operations (a fact with which you are so familiar as to require 
no further comment). 
As I understand it, the definition in the Navy of the word 
"strategy" varies at different echelons of command: that the 
strategy to be pursued, we'll say, by the officer commanding a 
:fleet of destroyers would be one thing; the strategy of a man in com-
3 
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r,nand of a fleet would be another; the strategy of a m,an in com'.'. 
mand of all the naval forces in .an area like the Pacific would be 
still something else; the strategy of a chief of naval operations 
would be on a still different level. And. then on the top of all this 
apex is the President of the United States who, after all, has tlle 
final say.-
_Not only does the definition of strategy change with the 
echelon of command, it changes with time, and with changed cir,. 
cumstances. There have been certain changes in the character 
and-.. conduct of war for the last two hundred years which, of 
necessity, :would have. changed certain of our attitudes toward the 
term·''strat�gy" and cert�in of our associations .with the terni. Tlle 
criticaLquestion at the moment how,ever, it seems. to me, is wh�ther 
strategy is a concept which operates only in wartime or is a ·con­
cept which is applicable to times of peace as well. My own feel­
ing is very strong that the term strategy must be considered as 
operating even when there are no active hostilities. 
I do not mean that there is general agreement o� the part of 
writers in this field. For example, there is an article in the current 
nmnber of World Politics by Bernard Brodie, �n . old student . of
mine, who says it is a mistake to use the term strategy in �on.,. 
· nection with peacetime or in connection with politics. Re prefe�s
the . words "security policy" as a definition of the things that I
would call "grand strategy." Discussions about semantics are
singularly futile things which l would prefer to avoid. But one
of the reasons why I prefer to use the term, "national strategy'';
or if you like, "grand strategy", even as applied to peacetime, is
that if we use the term, we will be less likely than· we otherwise
would be to overlook the strategic factors in policy, as we have so
often overlooked them in the past. Therefore I would like to keep
the word "strategy" in the forefront of our peacetime thinking,
4 
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as well as in the forefront of our wartime thinking, lest we make 
critical errors of judgment. We must not overlook one of the 
fundamental truths of politics, namely that most political decisions 
in the field of international relations have strategical implications 
and, vice versa, strategical decisions have their inevitable impact 
on politics. 
A British historian once said that the British Empire was 
built up in a fit of absent-mindedness, a phrase which is very gen­
erally quoted and which has an element of truth. But, if you look 
over the history of Britain's decisions as to what she would take 
as the reward for victory in any given situation, you are impressed 
by the very strong influence that the Admiralty had in the making 
of ultimate decisions. Usually wars broke out without any thought 
that at their termination Britain would end up with another island 
in the Mediterranean, or with a position as important, we'll say, as 
the Cape of Good Hope. But, when it was being decided at the end 
of the war what was to be done in the way of exacting some 
penalty from the loser to reward the victor for victory, the Ad­
miralty usually stepped in and discovered that there were some 
positions of the loser which might be of use to British sea power, 
and the civilian agencies of the British government not only heard 
the Admiralty but usually accepted their recommendations-not 
universally, but usually. 
If I had time I could spend a few moments of profit and 
amusement on the manner in which Benjamin Franklin frustrated 
the Lords of the British Admiralty in connection with what Britain 
would take at the end of the Seven Year's war, known in our his­
tories as the French and Indian War. The Admiralty wanted to take 
the French West Indian Islands and leave France in North America, 
and Franklin was determined to get France out of North America 
and leave her the West Indian Islands; and Franklin won out in 
the ultimate debate. 
5 
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On the other hand, it has been. rare in American experi­
ence for the military forces to have any influence whatsoever in 
determining what should be done in matters of this sort. For ex­
ample· in 1898, the United States could have had all of the former 
Spanish Islands in the Pacific. We chose to take only the Phil­
ippines and Guam, leaving the rest of the islands to Spain. They 
were thereupon sold by Spain to Germany without any protest on 
the part of the United States. They were seized by Japan in 1914 
without any reservation being entered by the United States con­
cerning our interests in the matter. They were given to Japan 
by the treaties of Versailles in 1918 without effective interposi­
tion of the United States, except that they were placed under man­
date rather than under Japanese sovereignty-a device which 
proved to be a difference rather than real distinction. We had to 
win those islands back at tremendous costs, as so many of you 
in this room know, in World War Two. 
Not only did the armed forces have nothing to say about 
such questions, but it is doubtful that at that time they them­
selves would have had as broad a grasp of the realities of Pacific 
strategy as we had somewhat later. And it is certain that no 
civilian agency in the government gave any thought whatsoever 
to the question of the disposition of those islands in relation to 
the larger strategic interests of the United States and the 
Pacific area. 
It is because of that kind of blunder on our part, a blunder 
that the British ordinarily did not make before the war of 1914, 
which I think would warrant our keeping this word "strategy" 
before us as a peacetime concept as well as a wartime concept. 
Decisions must be made, if the interests of the United States are 
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So, if you want to call "national strategy," "security policy", 
I think you are using a somewhat undramatic term, to put it mildly. 
Instead of "national strategy", you are not only using a less des­
criptive, a less dramatic term, but you are running a risk that 
you will, in the use of that term, depart from one of the things 
that is of principal consideration; namely, that political decisions 
would be made with constant reference to their strategical im­
plications. 
Now a moment or two as to the way in which this term 
strategy is used in language other than purely military language. 
Hitler, for example, continuously used the term "broadened strat­
egy," by which he meant a strategy somewhat wider than a purely 
military strategy. And Hitler was a genius at using political in­
strumentalities and political formulas. as a means of weakening the 
enemy's resistance to the program which he was in the process of 
turning out. A young American journalist wrote a vivid and ex­
citing book in 1940 called, The Strategy of Terror, in which he said 
that the principal weapon in the armory of the Nazies, even before 
the shooting started in the War of 1939, was the terrorization of 
other peoples so that they would either be afraid to resist, or that 
they would resist half-heartedly, feeling that resistance would, in 
any case, be futile. 
Diplomacy has been called the strategy of peace. And I 
have heard General Eisenhower ref er frequently in the last few 
months to the "strategy of bankruptcy" that the Soviet Union may 
be following_;_a, policy of compelling the United States to resist 
Soviet pressure at so many points that the burden of responsibility 
will be greater than our economy can bear. So that the word strat­
egy in common usage, quite aside from those used in military 
textbooks, would suggest that it is no longer purely a milit�ry 
thing but is a concept which has non-military phases. 
7 
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Now, how did this all come about? Well, during the period 
up until 1789 or 1793 in Europe, war was a comparatively simple 
thing, fought with. relatively small mercenary armies for limited 
objectives. With the French Revolution and the war which broke 
out between France and the rest of Europe in 1792-1793 you had an 
entirely new concept of the Army, and you had the beginnings of the 
nation-in-arms, backed, in the case of the French Revolution, with 
a tremendous ideological urge. Then the rise of industrialization in 
Europe transformed the conduct of war from one which was a 
relatively simple operation to one which involved the total resources 
of the state, scientific, technological, industrial and the like. The 
rise of nationalism required not merely that an Army should be a 
conscript Army but also that the Army must know what it was 
fighting for, since it would be likely to fight only for objectives 
which were national objectives as distinct from the old dynastic 
objectives. 
. The Europeanization of the world, the spread of European 
civilization throughout the world meant too, beginning with 1763 
-or even earlier than that-that every war was a world war, and
that decisions concerning the conduct of the war had to be made not 
concerning a single front in a limited geographical area, but in a 
great variety of fronts in a great many geographical areas, so that 
a very changed character and extent of war meant that you had to 
have new definitions of strategy to conform to an entirely new 
state of affairs. 
Now, in a sense, the fundamentals of war haven't changed, 
as war in its inception is a political act, not a military act. The 
decision to go to war, or not to go to war, is taken by people 
who are essentially civilian in their attitudes, even though they 
may be at the given moment officers of the armed forces; or they 
may have the dual status that I mentioned of being both civilians 
8 
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and commanders in chief. But the decision to go to war is usually 
taken by· a· person who is· civilian in attitude and who makes his 
decisions for political rather than military considerations. I don't 
like to quote the remarks of Clausewitz that "War is the continua­
tion of politics by other means-", because it is cited so often that 
it seems almost a bromide now. But it is nevertheless really true .. 
· As he said, war has a different vocabulary, but it has essentially
the same purposes as politics.
Further, the conduct of war in this day and generation is 
likewise essentially a civilian matter. For one simple thing, the 
civilians determine who shall be in command-which is a matter 
of great moment in the conduct of war; And the ability to spot 
. able and winning commanders is an ability of great moment to the 
state. If you don't think so, just compare our situation in'. this 
war with the situation in the Civil War when we had a whole 
series of Burnsides, and Popes and "Fighting Joe" Hookers and 
the like; where Lincoln seemed, at least in the early days of the 
war, to be unable to pick winning commanders for the principal 
theater of war. 
Even in questions which are supposedly purely military, the 
civilians frequently make the critical decisions. There is one 
little quotation from Lloyd George's memoirs which I'd like to 
read here. The question was before the British in the spring of 
1915, as to the number of machine guns that they should provide 
for the new army-the new army which had been brought into 
being after the declaration of war in August 1914. And Kitchener, 
who was the Minister of War in virtual command of the British 
Army, suggested that the existing number of two machine guns 
per battalion ought to be increased to perhaps four, but that any­
thing over four would be a luxury. Of this Lloyd George said, 
and this is from his memoirs: 
9 
9
Earle: Notes on the Term Strategy
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949
RESTRICTED 
.. "T,ake · Kitchener's maximum, four 'per battalion, square it, 
multiply· the result by tw<>; and,. when you are in sight 
. of that, double it again for good luck." 
· Thus Lloyd George, a civilian minister; multiplied the requis­
ition of the · Chief of the· British · Armed · Forces· for machine guns 
by sixteen. And by the late suminer of 1915 the British Army was 
complaining that it still didn't have enough ·machine guns. 
The same thing was true with Lloyd George's putting great­
er emphasis on high explosive shells, as compared with ·Shrapnel 
shells, very early in the war. So that a great many decisions which 
seem to be military, even in their essence, are civilian, even in the 
making of decisions in war time. The more· you see of the con­
duet of the First World War the more you realize what a tre;. 
mendous role Lloyd George and Churchill played in Britain and 
what a tremendous role Rathenau played in · Germany ·in· these 
respects., 
. Of course, you could go on with this sort of. thing, mention-
ing the complicated question of whether ships at sea ·· should be 
convoyed in the face of the submarine menace-a decision which 
w11,s mad� by Lloyd George, personally;, a decision that they should 
be convoyed. The question of using tanks was a decision which 
. . . ' . . ' ' 
Chul'Chill made and which he virtually rammed. do� the throats 
. ·. . . .  . . 
pf the British Army against their will. I'm not talking of such 
larger que�tions of strategy-such as a war of maneuver to be used 
by flank attacks through the Dardanelles or Italy versus a war of 
' . " '  . ' ' 
attrition-,-because there some of the civilian decisions seem, in 
retrospect, to be wrong.· But one could cite ahn:ost as many cases 
�here the military decisions were also wrong. 
. . 
In World War Two the same thing was true-that il' great 
many of these critical decisions were made by civilians. I suppose 
one of the decisions which took the greatest courage, the greatest 
10 
10
Naval War College Review, Vol. 2 [1949], No. 10, Art. 2
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss10/2
R�STRICTED 
moral courage, was Churchill's decision to ship out of the British 
Isles, in the critical days of 1940, large supplies· of British tanks, 
virtually all of their tanks, to North Africa which he had deter­
mined to hold and leave Britain itself, then facing invasion, without 
tanks. That· decision took courage and balance, . and, in the end, 
proved to be the right decision. 
The question of how much of the national resources should 
be devoted to air power is essentially a civilian decision in Britain 
and, in some instances, a civilian decision in the United States. A 
question of inter-allied unity of command. was a civilian decision 
in. both the first and the second world wars and, . in this . ease, 
we avoided the catastrophic results of failing to have unity of com­
mand. for a long time. And . the decision to make the European 
Theater the principal area of oper�tion was a decision which 
Churchill succeeded in persuading both our military and our civil".' 
ian authorities to accept again. It was a correct decision. I cite 
these as showing that even in military matters civilians have to 
make decisions in wartime which seem to be of military character. 
War, too, is a social revolution; it does things to the social and 
economic structure of a nation. It creates strains and stresses 
which can be resolved only by far-reaching revolutionary chang�§l 
in society and those changes have to be initiated and carried out by 
the civilian authorities as well as suggested, in some instances, by 
the military authorities. 
As to making peace, the decision as to when peace negotia­
tions will be opened and what will be the terms of peace is primarily 
a civilian, rather than a military question. Even in time of peace 
no political decisions of great moment. in international affairs can 
be made without their military implications, and very few strategic 
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There was a feeling in mo-st prof essionaJ armed forces before 
1914, and there still is...,....and there is reason for it-that politics 
is- something. which the· professional officer should not interfere 
with. And that's a sound judgment. But politics is not something 
which the professional officer should not be informed about, be­
cause failure to be informed about the political results of strategic 
decisions may be catastrophic. 
I'd like to cite here two German officers of great professional 
competence-one was Tirpitz, the builder of the German Navy� 
the other was Schlieff en, the Chief of the German General Staff 
before the First World War. Schlieffen persistently took the atti­
tude that politics was no concern of the regular officer-'-that the de:.. 
cision should be made on· the merits of the military case without 
reference to political repercussions-that politics was the business 
of the civilian authorites. Tirpitz took the opposite point of view-
that politics was the· business of the professional officer. Both 
officers helped bring Germany to grief in the First World War. 
Whereas, if you should have a somewhat middle of the road line that 
it is the business of the professional officer to be informed about 
political matters and to make strategical decisions in the light of 
the political facts of the case-he doesn't need either to intervene 
.. in political decisions on the one hand, or to ignore them on the 
other as being outside his field of interest or competence. What 
I mean by that is that Schlieffen drew up the famous plan, that 
. you all know about, for knocking France out of the war before 
Russia could effectively mobilize. He was indifferent to the political 
consequences of going through Belgium. That, in his ·mind, was 
up to the German government to arrange. One of the catastrophic 
errors of the war was the German decision to go through Belgium 
even though political accommodations for that act had not been 
arrived at ... So that, if a brilliant officer ignores political considera-
tions, as Schlieffen persisted in doing, the results may be disastrous. 
12 
12
Naval War College Review, Vol. 2 [1949], No. 10, Art. 2
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss10/2
RESTRICTED 
It is doubtful if Britain could have been brought into the war so 
soon if it had not been for the issue of Belgium; and, if she hadn't 
been · brought into the war so soon, the results of the war might 
have been quite different. 
On the other hand, Tirpitz actively interfered in politics 
continuously. He understood their military implications, when he 
took an active part in effecting political decisions to see that things 
went his way. Furthermore, from the very beginning, he con­
ceived of the German Navy as having a political, not a naval ob­
jective. I could recommend very highly as an entertaining, in­
teresting book, Tirpitz's Memoirs. They are very well done and 
they give a picture of a type of naval thought that is worth seri­
ous study. Tirpitz's view was-at least it may have been preliminary 
to a larger view-but he never got the chance to enlarge the or­
iginal concephthat the German Navy probably would never be 
able to effectively challenge the British high seas fleet; but that, 
if Germany had a big enough navy to make it risky for Britain to 
fight Germany at all, the Navy would have the effect of keeping 
Britain out of the war-the war which most German staff offi­
cers presumed would come in Western Europe. So the German 
navy was built on the idea that it would be a continuous threat 
to the British fleet in the British home waters. That was a political 
goal for the Navy, rather than essentially a naval goal. That is an 
interpretation, if you like, but I think it is essentially a sound 
interpretation. The German navy could have built a navy primarily 
for waging a war against British commerce, and it could have put 
still heavier emphasis on the submarine before the outbreak of the 
war in 1914. The German High Seas Fleet was designed as a 
means of keeping Britain out of the war. And Tirpitz miscalcu­
lated, because he didn't understand two things; first, that it was 
possible for the British to make all sorts of accommodations with 
other powers so as to strengthen their fleet in home waters; and, 
13 
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second, that the one thing that Britain would not tolerate froni 
any power on the continent of Europe was a real threat to the se­
curity of the British Isles such as the German fleet implied, and as 
Tirpitz intended it to imply. 
I mention these two very gifted German professional officers 
as illustrations of the danger of being uninformed about politics 
and of the danger of either jgnoring them, as Schieff en was in­
clined to do, or of attempting to influence political decisions, as 
Tirpitz continuously tried to do. 
There is a rather nice little story of Tirpitz's interfering in 
political· decisions in a more direct way. In 1912 to '13, when the 
British were trying to come to a naval understanding with the Ger­
mans on the basis of limiting the construction of capital ships, 
Churchill went to see the German naval attache, at least met him in­
formally, and said, "Now we really mean business about this; we 
really want to cut down the building programs of both nations; 
we want to come to an accommodation with Germany." And the 
German naval attache wrote a private letter to Tirpitz and said, 
"What do I do with this information?" Tirpitz wrote back and 
said, "You tell the German Ambassador that you have had a con­
versation with Churchill and that your impression is that Churchill 
was not very sincere about these naval negotiations." That's how 
far Tirpitz was willing to go. in influencing political· decisions. But, 
as I say, I'm not sure that this story is in his memoirs. We have 
all of Tirpitz's papers, incidentally, in the National Archives in 
Washington, and any of you who read German could have some 
fun spending some time reading Tirpitz's papers, to advantage. 
Now I have taken a shot at a definition of strategy which you 
can find in Makers of Modern Strategy. I'm just going to take 
time to read this and make comment on it, if I may. 
14 
"Strategy deals with war, preparation of war, and the 
waging of war. Narrowly defined, it is the art of military 
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command, of projecting and directing a campaign. The 
Oxford dictionary defines it in a sense as the art of the 
Commander in Chief. It is different from tactics which is 
the art of handling forces in battle in much the same 
way as an orchestra is different from its individual 
instruments. 
Until about the end of the 18th century, strategy con­
sisted of a body of strategems and tricks of war, "ruses 
de guerre", by which a general sought to deceive the 
enemy. But as war and society have become more com­
plicated-and war is an inherent part of society-strategy 
has of necessity required increasing co�sideration of the 
non-military factors: economic, psychological, moral, pol­
itical and technological. 
Strategy therefore is not merely a concept of wartime 
but inherent element of statecraft at all times. Only the 
most restricted terminology would now define strategy as 
the art of military command." 
In preparing this book Makers of Modern Strategy, we 
brought · all sorts of people into the picture who wouldn't fit into 
the category of military commanders. You know we use Marx and 
Engels as fathers of the strategy w�ich to some extent the Soviet 
Union has followed, the strategy of subversion, of subverting the 
political integrity and the moral conviction in other states in the 
justice of their cause. We took Alexander Hamilton and Rath­
enau as the fathers of a nation with great industrial potential for 
war. It was the conscious objective of Hamilton and Rathenau to 
make the United States and Germany, respectively, nations of 
great war potentials as they were certain to become by becoming 
great industrial nations. 
One can, if you like, accept the Brodie point of view­
that these matters should be properly called "security policy" 
rather than "strategy." As I say, that to some extent is a mat-
15 
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ter of semantics but basically, to me, the important thing is to keep 
continuously, by the use of the term strategy, national strategy or 
grand strategy in the mind of the politician the idea that strategical 
factors must be taken into consideration in making political de­
cisions, and to keep continuously in the mind of the professional of­
ficer the necessity of being informed upon politics, national and in­
ternational, even though he may not take and perhaps should not 
take an active part in influencing political decisions. 
To go back to Tirpitz and Schieff en again, the Chief of the 
German General Staff was of course the great figure in Germany. 
The Navy in its early days was small potatoes in the national scheme 
of things. As the Chief of the German General Staff, SchUeffen, 
if he had been more alert than he was politically, might have seen 
the political consequences of the vast German naval building pro­
gram; and even as a soldier, had he been more alert, he would have 
seen that from the point of view of Germany the building of a 
fleet of this kind was a diversion of the resources of the nation 
away from the basic plan. The Schlieffen Plan came within a hair's 
breath of succeeding in 1914. If all of the resources that had gone 
into the German navy from 1898 to 1914 had been available to the 
right wing of the German army in those critical days of August 
1914, the battle of the Marne might never have been fought, 
Paris might have been captured and the war won by Germany 
by a fairly safe margin. So that one can't overlook, in making 
plans, the inter-relations of the Services to one another. I'm not 
suggesting by this that all navies belong in that category. It's just 
that in the nature of things the Germans could never hope to obtain 
a navy of decisive character-a high seas fleet which could de­
cide the outcome of the war. Their mere possession of a fleet 
capable of challenging the British decided the outcome of the war 
against them, which was one of the great German ,catastrophies. 
The more I read of history the more I am convinced that 
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history is sometimes -- governed by coincidence. One of the - most 
fateful coincidences in history is the fact that the United States 
and Germany both became great powers at the same time. Had 
the United States become a great power fifty years later than she 
did, Germany might well have won the First World War. In fact, I 
think she would have won the First World War. Had the United 
States not been a great power in 1940, Germany would almost cer­
tainly have won the Second World War. And what is it in history 
that accounted for this pure coincidence? The U�ited. Stat�s might 
have become a world power fi:fty years later. Then you get back into 
so many causes as to why_ so many people wanted to get out of 
Europe and come· to the United States and thus build · up the 
population and the resources . of this virgin continent. Cohici­
dence frequently plays a g:reat role, and coincidence of the Ger­
man navalchallenge p:roved to be a challenge to the United States, 
as well as to Britain, in the years 1914 to 1917. It was a matter 
which very few Germans could have foreseen and which virtually 
no American foresaw. Admiral Sims had a pretty clear picture of 
the situation, but he was virtually alone in that· respect for a con­
siderable period of time. 
Now no ·nation, of course, can afford to make an over-all 
foreign policy without reference to considerations of national se-
- ' 
. 
curity; that is, after all, fundamental. You take the history of 
French policy over three hundred years; and the m:ore it changes, 
_the more it remains the same thing, until the unhappy days be­
tween the two ·world wars when the French didn't seem to be able 
to make any eff ecfive decisions. And pretty much the · same thing 
was true of Britain. But the French had running through their 
history-three clear cut objectives; _one was to keep· Germany dis­
united, because a disunited Germany was not a serious threat tp the 
integrity of France; the second, was . to have allies in Eastern 
Europe and Southern Europe so that, in the event France did have 
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to .fight Germany, Germany would have to fight a wa.r on two fronts; 
and a third objective was to have frontiers which were relatively 
easily defendable because they were natural frontiers-mountains 
and rivers and the like-or failing "natural frontiers" to have 
fortified frontiers. And it was only when the French got away from 
those basic factors, which ruled for three hundred years, that they 
were finally and irrevocably defeated by the Germans in 1940. 
The British have had a similar long-term security policy. At 
the heart of that policy was the determination, over a period of 
three hundred years, not to allow any naval power to rise which 
would threaten the security of Britain's home waters. And 
corollary to that was the idea that no powers must control the low 
countries, which are across the narrow body of water, across the 
straits, from Britain itself; and, finally, that no power must domi­
nate the whole continent of Europe, because any power controlling 
the whole continent of Europe would be in a position to build an ef­
fective sea power paramount to that of Britain. And I could go on 
with the United States and the Soviet Union as to these controlling 
factors, as to these security factors, in making a foreign policy. 
Those are things that no statesman may ignore except at the 
national peril. At the same time, in individual cases, wrong de­
cisions may be made because of failure to take account of the 
strategical factor, as I cited in the case of the· Pacific Islands. So 
that the wise statesman will keep continuously in the forefront, 
rather than in the background of his thinking, the idea that strategy 
is a concept of politics as well as a concept of war. 
There is just one closing thought I'd like to throw out, 
and that is, that it is important for the professional officer to be 
informed on politics-the more broadly the better. Not merely so 
that he can help to make the correct strategical decisions, but be­
cause, at times, he has to make decisions which are political or 
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quasi-political in character. There are always·some questions which 
the civilian agencies of the government will not answer. In other 
words, you can't draw a war plan without certain presumptions as 
to who the enemy is going to be. It seems easy to do that now 
because you know who is right over the horizon. We know that 
now, but you remember the case of Woodrow Wilson.seriously sug­
gesting that the Chief of Staff be fired in 1916 because he had draft­
�d a plan for American campaigns against Germany in the event 
we became involved iri the European war. Wilson had the theory 
that merely drawing up a plan as to what you'd do if you got into 
war with Germany would prejudice the good relations between the 
United States and Germany, which at that time, even in the midst 
of war, in which we clearly were going to be involved, he wished to 
maintain on a cordial level. 
Questions like, who is the enemy going to be? How near or 
how remote is the possibility of hostilities? These are questions 
which again civilian agencies of the government are always re­
luctant to answer. Now I'm well aware that dealing with questions 
of that kind on a military level is playing with dynamite, but it 
is also playing with dynamite not to deal with them. And so you 
have the real fact that you do have to deal with them. And you 
have the fact that it is dangerous to deal with them. And part of 
the art of being a soldier, or an airman, or a great commander of 
naval forces is to deal� not with easy questions which anybody 
could answer, but with the difficult questions. 
I'd like to read one other thing; I'm going to leave this be­
hind me. This is a brief statement taken from a lecture I gave in 
Denver a year or so ago on "What is National Power?" and this 
paragraph has been said by various· people to be worth quoting. 
"National power in the present day world is a complex 
and diverse phenomena. It is no longer the 'walled towns, 
stored arsenals and armories, goodly races of horses, 
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· chariots of war; elephants, ordnance artillery' and the like
to which Francis Bacon ref erred more than three centuries
ago .. Neither is gold the major source of nationa}might, as
was thought by the mercantilists of the 18th century.
Power is now, as it conventionally has been, men and ships
and guns. It is planes, rockets, bombs. It is landing craft,
flame throwers, machine guns. It is radar devices and fire
control mechanisms. But even more,. it is factories and
farms, assembly lines and tractors, skilled labor and tech­
nicia:qs, labor.atories anq. the scientists who work in them.
It is the ribbons of steel called railroads and the ribbons of
concrete called. supe,r highways. It is the pronouncements
of statesmen aild the teachings of seers. It is tefophone
wire and radio communications. It is atomic weapons and
the means of.their manufacture. It is all the·multifariolis
forms in which modern industry, modern agriculture:, mod­
ern communications and modern finance manifest them­
selves. It is also education, the press, the church, the spirit
of. our youth. There is no . phase of American life which
does not contribute to our national power. Conversely, we ..
could not sacrifice any appreciable portion of our power
without curtailing some vital activity and impairing some
essential quality of the American people.
In other words, we cannot escape the role of Great 
Power which History and Destiny have thrust upon us. A . 
rich man may forsake the world and give all his goods to 
the poor. But the wisdom of man and the art of the poli­
tician know not how a Great Power can divert itself of 
those things which can make it a Great Power. Power 
then is fundamentally a matter of fact, not volition. We 
may use our· power, or misuse our power. But we. cannot 
discard our power or conjure it away." 
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